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FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION II (UNAVEM II)

INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in response to paragraph 15 of Security Council resolution 834 (1993) of 1 June 1993, by which the Council requested the Secretary-General:

"to submit to it as soon as the situation warrants, and in any case before 15 July 1993, a report on the situation in Angola with his recommendation for the further role of the United Nations in the peace process and, in the meantime, to keep the Council regularly informed of developments".

2. Since the adoption of the above resolution, the Council has been periodically kept informed of developments in the Angolan situation. Previously, on 27 May 1993, I requested the President of the Security Council (S/25882) to bring to the attention of its members that I had agreed reluctantly to accede to the wish expressed by my Special Representative for Angola, Miss Margaret Joan Anstee, to be released from her responsibilities. I further informed the Council of my intention, following consultations, to appoint Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mali, to replace Miss Anstee as my Special Representative for Angola, effective 28 June 1993. In a letter (S/25883) dated 4 June 1993, the President of the Security Council informed me that members of the Council welcomed my decision and wished to express their appreciation to Miss Anstee for the courage and untiring dedication she had shown as Special Representative for Angola in especially difficult circumstances. I share these sentiments and would like to reiterate my appreciation for Miss Anstee's service to the cause of peace in Angola. As peace remains elusive in that long-suffering country, I am confident that my new Special Representative will spare no efforts in order to promote the attainment of this common objective.

I. POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION

3. In the six weeks since my report to the Security Council dated 25 May 1993 (S/25840), the scenario that was feared following the suspension on 21 May of the Abidjan peace talks appears, unfortunately, to have come to pass. The Angolan political and military situation has continued to deteriorate dangerously as fighting has intensified and as the mistrust which has inhibited meaningful political accommodation has deepened. The consequences, both for Angola and for regional security, are increasingly worrying. The neighbouring countries are receiving large inflows of Angolan refugees and have expressed growing concern as the fighting has spread closer to their borders. Other countries, in particular those with long-standing ties with Angola or those with nationals and property in the country, are also increasingly anxious over the worsening situation.

4. Repeated efforts by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to seize additional territory have called into serious question its declarations about peaceful intentions. The encircled provincial capital cities of Cuito/Bie, Malange and Menongue continue to hold out under government control after months of an increasingly tightening siege. UNITA has also intensified attacks on another provincial capital, Caxito, some 50 kilometres from Luanda. The seizure of the oil-producing town of Soyo and the diamond-producing town of Cafunfo is obviously aimed at causing serious economic losses to the Government. Meanwhile, the Government recently reintroduced military conscription; and the National Assembly, on 17 June 1993, adopted a resolution empowering the Government to use any means, including placing the country on a war footing, in order to confront the UNITA offensive. As the fighting has intensified throughout the national territory, so too have mutual accusations of the use of mercenaries and other foreign forces. In addition, there have been reports that both sides have entered into arrangements with foreign sources for the supply of military equipment and other support.

5. In a particularly serious incident, UNITA ambushed a train between Quipungo and Matala in Huila Province on 27 May, as a result of which up to 300 people, including women and children, died and hundreds of others were wounded. UNITA alleged that the train was ferrying troops and weapons and not civilians, as claimed. Following the attack, UNAVEM helicopters evacuated 57 seriously injured civilians, mostly women and children, from the site. I am deeply concerned about the continued fighting, which is impeding chances for peace and has aggravated an already catastrophic humanitarian situation in Angola. I therefore support the statement made by the President of the Security Council to the press on 8 June 1993 in which the Council strongly condemned the 27 May train attack and urged UNITA's leaders to make sure that its forces abide by the rules of international humanitarian law.

6. The meeting of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), convened at Cairo in June 1993, called on UNITA to resume as soon as possible the peace talks with the Government with a view to establishing a definitive cease-fire and ensuring the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz para Angola". I took the opportunity of my participation in the OAU Summit to consult extensively with President José Edouardo dos Santos and other African leaders on ways and means of advancing the peace process in Angola.

7. The United States of America, which inaugurated its Embassy in Luanda on 22 June 1993, following its recognition of the Government of Angola on 19 May, stated its willingness to continue to work with the Government and UNITA towards resuming peace talks. The South African Government has reopened its diplomatic liaison mission in Luanda, and on 4 June the Foreign Ministers of the two countries met at Windhoek for formal talks brokered by the Foreign Minister of Namibia. In addition, the President of Namibia has invited Dr. Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA, to visit Namibia. The three observer countries (Portugal, the Russian Federation and the United States), which are continuing to play an important role in the peace process, met on 8 June 1993 in Washington and, most recently, on 8 July in Moscow. In a strongly worded statement, they called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and reaffirmed that it should be the goal of the international community to re-establish the cease-fire, complete the key aspects of the Peace Accords and implement the principles contained in the Draft Memorandum of Understanding of the Abidjan Protocol. They also agreed that the United Nations should continue its role in the search for a peaceful solution in Angola.

8. Since his arrival in Angola on 30 June, my Special Representative has been pursuing, at various levels, intensive consultations aimed at resuming the peace talks under United Nations auspices with a view to the establishment of a cease-fire throughout the country and the full implementation of the "Acordos de Paz". In his meeting with President dos Santos on 5 July at Luanda and with Dr. Savimbi on 8 July at Huambo, the Special Representative explored in detail various avenues to reopening the peace process. Mr. Beye reiterated my intention to recommend to the Security Council an enlarged United Nations peace-keeping presence on the condition that a comprehensive agreement was reached. Similarly, he also explored with the parties ideas contained in paragraph 38 of my previous report (S/25840) on Angola, which stressed the importance of providing adequate protection to ensure the security of humanitarian relief personnel and to guarantee that aid reached the Angolan civilian populations in need. Based on these discussions, my Special Representative reported to me on 9 July that the atmosphere might be right for some optimism for relaunching the peace negotiations.

9. In the course of the initial discussions with my new Special Representative, the Government and UNITA have expressed their readiness to resume peace talks and to facilitate humanitarian relief operations. Dr. Savimbi also stressed that he saw the need for the United Nations to assume an effective mediation role. Mr. Beye emphasized that the international community, as reflected in recent Security Council resolutions, was increasingly worried about the prevailing situation in Angola and stressed the need to preserve and consolidate the progress achieved during the recent Abidjan talks. Genuine political will and concrete action were essential in order to overcome the current impasse and to help bring the war and the suffering to an end. Only after such genuine commitment had been ascertained would new direct negotiations be useful and productive.

II. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

10. From the outset of the renewed hostilities, the United Nations agencies and programmes did everything possible with their locally available resources to provide emergency humanitarian assistance in Angola. Almost 2 million people are now at risk and need food and non-food aid to survive. Despite logistical difficulties and security concerns, relief supplies have been delivered and distributed by the United Nations in conjunction with local and international non-governmental organizations. The United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) in the office of the Special Representative plays a major coordinating role in this process. A United Nations Consolidated Appeal for Angola was presented at a Donors Conference in Geneva on 3 June 1993; the response, estimated at some US\$ 70 million, though falling short of the appeal target of US\$ 226 million, was nevertheless promising.

11. Given the absence of a cease-fire and the resulting risks encountered in the delivery of emergency relief, the Special Representative has actively pursued the one-month emergency relief plan described in paragraph 24 of my report to the Council dated 25 May 1993 (S/25840). Having secured the approval in principle of both the Government and UNITA to this plan, he informed the parties on 17 June 1993 of the starting date of its implementation. Accordingly, on 21 June, World Food Programme (WFP) aircraft flew to Saurimo, with 12 metric tonnes of food; to Luena, with 12 metric tonnes of food; and to Huambo, carrying UNICEF blankets, medicines, and 2 metric tonnes of vegetable oil from WFP. However, the whole plan was suspended after UNITA denied access to the besieged cities of Cuito/Bie, Malange and Menongue, and the Government in response decided to suspend flights temporarily pending the establishment of secure conditions to carry out flights to all destinations indicated in the United Nations plan. Since then, progress has been reported in negotiating the resumption of the plan and the Director of UCAH hopes to finalize the details during a forthcoming visit to Huambo.

12. I would like to stress once again that the effectiveness of any relief operation, especially in a situation of ongoing military confrontation, depends above all on the cooperation of the combatants. This is why I reiterate my strong appeal to the Angolans to abide by the rules of international humanitarian law and to facilitate unimpeded access for the delivery of relief to the population in need.

13. In a related development, the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, held recently at Vienna, adopted on 24 June 1993 a declaration which urged the Security Council to take steps towards reaching an immediate and effective cease-fire and restoring peace and security in Angola, and also called upon the international community to extend immediate humanitarian assistance to Angola. I should also like to express my relief that, after extensive negotiations, cooperation has been extended by UNITA to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in ensuring the long-awaited evacuation of foreign nationals who had been trapped in Huambo.

III. SITUATION OF UNAVEM II

14. In my report of 25 May 1993 (S/25840) to the Security Council, I recommended a further interim extension of UNAVEM II, on a reduced basis, and in a manner which would respond to the evolution of the military and political situation. The mission would provide good offices and mediation, with the goal of restoring a cease-fire and reinstating the peace process along the lines of the Bicesse Accords. On 9 July, Major-General Chris Abutu Garuba (Nigeria), to whose appointment the members of the Security Council agreed earlier this year (S/25343), assumed command as Chief Military Observer of UNAVEM II. In this connection, I should like to pay tribute to Brigadier-General Michael Nyambuya (Zimbabwe), who has been acting as Chief Military Observer, for his distinguished service in his very difficult assignment.

15. In conformity with paragraph 1 of Security Council resolution 834 (1993), I have reduced the size of the Mission to its current strength of 43 international civilian staff, 50 military observers, 18 police observers, 11 military paramedics, as well as necessary local staff. The activities of the UNAVEM II military and police components, which are currently deployed in four locations in addition to Luanda, are focused on patrolling, assessing the military situation, liaising with military and civilian officials, coordinating and assisting in the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population and participating in other humanitarian operations. Current staff and logistic resources are based on my assessment of the situation at the time Security Council resolution 834 (1993) was adopted. However, additional administrative support will be required on short notice if there is an increase in operations. UNAVEM also continues to support UCAH at its current level of activity.

16. Vehicles and prefabricated shelters, valued at \$773,000, have been recovered from several areas outside Luanda from which UNAVEM II withdrew following the outbreak of hostilities in January 1993. UNAVEM II remains at phase III security status and continues to cooperate closely on security matters with United Nations agencies operating in Angola. There are enough UNAVEM II and WFP aircraft in the country to airlift United Nations personnel in Angola to a safe haven, should that become necessary. Arrangements have also been made for a sea evacuation.

IV. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

17. The international community has made a major effort to help Angola peacefully settle its civil war in the expectation that free and fair elections would provide a basis for stability, rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country. The establishment of UNAVEM II was coupled with a major humanitarian assistance programme to relieve the suffering of the Angolan population. The unfortunate aftermath of the election, when one party rejected its results, brought continued civil war and hardship to Angolans. Renewed hopes were placed in the Abidjan talks of April 1993. Regrettably, while very nearly reaching success, those talks also had to be suspended. In the present circumstances, it would, of course, be unthinkable for the international community and the United Nations to abandon Angola. At the same time, it is the Angolans themselves who can ultimately establish a firm foundation for peace through agreements and

reconciliation. Policies of capturing territories and military strategy are incompatible with these goals.

18. UNAVEM II has become an essential factor in a continuous United Nations effort to facilitate the resumption of negotiations to advance the peace process, as well as to support vital humanitarian activities in the country. To some extent, the Mission is also important as a preventive measure to check further escalation of the conflict. In addition, it has become an indispensable channel for communication between the parties. With these considerations in mind, I recommend to the Security Council that the UNAVEM II mandate be extended for a period of three months to allow the United Nations to vigorously pursue a peace agreement. My Special Representative will continue to offer his good offices, to act as intermediary between the Government and UNITA and to assist them to build on the progress made in Abidjan in order to conclude an agreement for the peaceful settlement of the conflict in Angola.

19. This extension, the cost of which will be outlined in an addendum to the present report, will allow the Mission to respond to the developments in the peace process, including possible overall agreement. I very much hope that this period will be utilized for an active search for a lasting political solution, together with a strict and realistic timetable for its implementation. Once a timetable for the implementation of a peace agreement is established, I shall present specific proposals to the Security Council for the strengthening of the verification capabilities of UNAVEM II. I call on the international community to strongly encourage the parties towards the earliest return to the framework of the peace settlement based on the Bicesse Accords. Meanwhile, all avenues should be explored to ensure safe delivery of humanitarian aid to the needy in Angola. I strongly appeal to UNITA to allow the resumption without delay of the United Nations emergency humanitarian assistance plan.

20. In conclusion, I should like to pay a tribute to all UNAVEM II personnel who continue to serve with dedication to advance the peace process in Angola under difficult circumstances. My Special Representative, Mr. Beye, assisted by Major-General Garuba, have my full support in carrying out the challenging tasks ahead.
